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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOCAL
OPTION LAWS.
In an article contributed to this journal
some time since,1 the writer, after reviewing
the subject somewhat at length, arrived at the
conclusion that the local option laws are un-
constitutional. The article seems to have
been suggested by the efforts that were then
being made in the State of Ohio, to induce
the legislature of that State to enact a law of
this character. The conclusion, as embodied
in the writer's words, was as follows:
"Whether we look at this question in the light
of the overwhelming analogy furnished by the
decided weight of judicial authority in this
and other States, or whether we confine it to
the plain text of the Constitution of Ohio, it
seems difficult to reach any conclusion other
than that the scheme of local option, as it is
now urged upon the legislature and the pub-
lic of the State, will be found radically and
fundamentally defective when brought to the
decisive test of judicial scrutiny." We sin-
cerely doubt whether "the decided weight of
judicial authority" is quite so "overwhelm-
ing" in its character, as the writer seems to
have supposed. It certainly is not so "over-
whelming," as to render it "difficult to reach
any conclusion other than that the scheme"
was unconstitutional. The writer has evi-
dently over-estimated his difficulties, and mis-
taken the weight of authority. In the course
of the article referred to, Mr. Justice Cooley is
quoted to the following effect: "If the decision
of this question is to depend upon the weight of
judicial authority up to the present time, it
must be held that there is no power to refer
the adoption or rejection of a general law to
the people of the State, any more than the'e
is to refer it to any other authority. The pre-
vailing doctrine in the courts appears to be
that, except in those eases where, by the Con-
stitution, the people have expressly reserved
to themselves a power of decision, the func-
tions of legislation cannot be exercised by
them, even to the extent of accepting or re-
jecting a law which has been framed for their
consideration.''2 There is 'no doubt of the
perfect correctness of the propositions thus
laid down by the learned Chief Justice of
110 Cent. L. J. 203.
2 Const. Lir. p. 112.
Michigan, who has been worthily styled
"without doubt the foremost constitutional
lawyer of the country," and whose elevation
to the bench of the Supreme Court of the
United States would be hailed by the profes-
sion of the whole country as a most fitting
recognition. of his sound learning, great abil-
ities and perfectly spotless character. But it
will not do to infer that, because the proposi-
tions above quoted are unquestionably
correct, therefore, a local option law is
unconstitutional. The learned justice was
not referring to such laws, but to what is un-
questionably a maxim of constitutional law,
that the power to make laws cannot be dele-
gated. In a subsequent part of the treatise
from which the quotation was taken, occurs
this passage: "We think that at this time
the clear weight of authority is in support of
legislation of this nature, commonly known
as local option laws."
'3
The difficulty of enforcing a prohibitory
liquor law, has mainly consisted in the gen-
eral apathy which has prevailed in reference
to the subject. It is impossible to strictly en-
force a law against which public opinion is
arrayed. And prohibitory liquor laws have
not been sustained with the heartiness and
unanimity which'their advocates have hoped
for. This has been the strong argument
against their enactment. If it is not deemed
wise to enact a general prohibitory liquor law,
for the reason that it will not be enforced in
the greater part of tne State, as its opponents
claim; yet, what reason is there against pro-
hibiting the traffic in those portions of the
State in which public opinion is so aroused
against it as to demand li'ofction against its
evils by its suppression? If the people of a
municipality are in favor of the law, there is
no doubt but that it can be enforced in that
particular municipality; and there is no rea-
son why they should not be allowed to protect
themselves against the well-known evils to
which it exposes them. For this reason, many
of the States, whose legislatures have been
unwilling to pass a general prohibitory law,
suppressing the traffic throughout State lim-
its, have, nevertheless,- passed these local op-
tion laws, which put it within the power of the
subdivisions of the State to suppress the traf-
fic, provided a majority of the electors are in
favor of so doing.
3 Ibid. 162.
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The great question is, are these laws consti-
tutional? There is no doubt but that their
constitutionality has been very seriously ques-
tioned. Neither is there any doubt but that,
in numerous instances, such laws have been
held unconstitutional, as involving a delega-
tion of power. The legislature of Delaware,
at an early day, enacted a law authorizing the
citizens of the several counties of that State,
to determine whether the retail of intoxicating
liquors should be permitted within their re-
spective territorial limits. The act provided
for holding an election, and for the submis-
sion to the voters of the question of license or
no license, declaring that it should not be
lawful for any person to retail intoxicating
liquors within such county thereafter, if a
majority of the votes cast should be found to
be against license. The court of errors and
appeals, in Rice v. Foster,4 decided in 1847,
held that the law was void, as being an un-
constitutional delegation of the law-making
power. At about the same time, a similar
question was raised as to the validity of a like
statute passed by the legislature of Pennsyl-
vania, and the courts of that State, in Parker
v. Commonwealth, 5 adjudged the law uncon-
stitutional, for reasons similar to those which
prevailed in Delaware. In 1855, the Supreme
Court of Iowa, in Santo v. State, 6 held a local
option law unconstitutional. "The General
Assembly cannot legally submit to the peo-
ple," said the court, "the proposition whether
an act should become a law or not; and the
people have no power, in their primary or in-
dividual capactity, to make laws. They do
this by representatives. There is no doubt of
the authority of the legislature to pass an
act to take effect upon a contingency. But
what is a contingency in this sense and
connection? It is some event independ-
ent of the will of the law-m:iking power
as exercised in making the law, or some
event over which the legislature has not
control. For instance, the embargo laws
and their cessation were made to depend up-
on the action of foreign powers in relation to
certain decrees. The will of the law-maker is
not a contingency in relation to himself. It
may be such in relation to another and exter-
nal power, but to call it so in relation to him-
44 fHarr. 479.
6 Pa. St. 527.
6 2 (larke, 279.
self, is an abuse of language. Now, if the
people are to say whether or not an act shall
become a law, they become, or are put in
the place of the law-maker. And here is
the constitutional objection. Their will is
not a contingency upon which certain things
are, or are not to be done under the law;
but it becomes the determining power
whether such shall be the law or not."
The same court, in 1857, in Geebrick v.
State,7 and again in 1871, in State v. Weir,8
made a similar ruling. The Supreme Court
of Indiana,-in Maize v. State, 9 decided at an
early day, i'eached a similar conclusion as to
the unconstitutionality of a local option law
which had been submitted to the people. The
Supreme Court of Michigan, in People v.
Hawley, 1 was equally divided upon the ques-
tion. So that it must be conceded that the
early decisions upon this subject were de-
cidedly opposed to the validity of these enact-
ments. But the recent decisions, with the
exception of Exparte Wall, 1 decided in 1874,
are as decidedly in favor of their validity, and
leave no room for doubt but that such laws
may be constitutional. This change of ruling
is due somewhat to a change in the mode in
which the law itself is drhwn, as will be here-
after pointed out. And it is worthy of note,
that in the recent case of Ex parte Wall, the
California court was divided in opinion,-three
of the judges holding that the law was uncon-
stitutional, while the other two were equally
as decided in favor of its constitutionality.
But in 1873, the Supreme Court of Indiana
sustained the constitutionality of a law which
attained the same end as the ordinary local
option law, and which is so peculiar in its
character as to merit attention. This statute
provided that it should be unlawful to sell
without a permit from the county com-
missioners, and required every person de-
siring such permit, to file his application in
writing with the auditor of the proper county,
not less than twenty days before the first day
of the term of any regular session of the
board of county commissioners. This appli-
cation had to be signed, not merely by the
applicant, but also by a majority of the legal
7 5 Clarke, 491.
8 33 Iowa, 134.
9 4 Ind. 342.
10 3 Mich. 330.
11 48 Cal. 279.
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voters living in the same ward with the appli-
cant, if in a city, or in the town, if in an in-
corporated town or township. The court saw
no objection to the act, as "it was enacted in
the usual form of enacting laws, and was de-
clared by the legislature that it should be in
force from and after its passage."' 12 So the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which, as we
have seen, adjudged a local option law void
in 1847, did, in 1873, in Locke's Appeal,"3
adjudge a local option law valid. This last
act prohibited sale without license, and author-
ized the voters of a municipal district to de-
cide at an election for or against granting
license; and provided that in case the elec-
tion went against license, the issuing of the
license should be unlawful. In passing upon
the constitutionality of this statute, the court
said: "What did the legislature in this sec-
tion submit to the people, and what did they
not submit? This is quite as clear as any
other part of the act. Each elector is to vote
a ticket for license, or against license. He is
allowed by the law to say, 'I am for the
issuing of license,' or 'I am against the issu-
ing of licenses;' and thus to express his
judgment or opinion. But this was all he
was permitted by law to do. He declared no
consequences, and prescribed no rule result-
ing from his opinion. Nor does the majority
of votes declare a consequence. The return
of a majority is but of a mere numerical
preponderance of votes, and expresses on-
ly the opinion of the greater number of
electors upon the expediency or inexpe-
diency of licenses in this ward. When
this is certified by the return, the legis-
lature, not the voters, declare 'it shall (or it
shall not) be lawful for any license to issue
for the sale of spirituous liquors.' Thus it is
perfectly manifest this law was not made,
pronounced or ratified by the people; and the
majority vote is but an ascertainment of the
public sentiment-the expression of a general
opinion, which, as a fact, the legislature have
made the contingency on which the law shall
operate. When the law came from the halls
of legislation, it came a perfect law; man-
datory in all its parts, prohibiting in this
ward the sale of intoxicating liquors without
license; commanding an election to be held
every third year to ascertain the expediency
12 Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 557.
of issuing licenses, and when the fact of ex-
pediency or inexpediency shall have been re-
turned, commanding that licenses shall issue
or shall not issue."
The Supreme Court of Iowa, which, as we
have seen, had held a local opinion law uncon-
stitutional, upheld in Dalby v. Wolf,1l' decided
in 1862, this same distinction, and sustainef
the constitutionality of a law authorizing the
people of the several counties to decide by a
majority vote whether swine and sheep
should be restrained from running at large;
The court said that counsel utterly misap-
prehended the scope and spirit of the de-
cisions in Iowa and other States, which held
that the legislature could not refer to the
people the question, whether a particular act
should become a law, and declared that in
all the cases which had been referred to, the
question submitted haA been, whether or not
a proposed law should become operative.
For instance, in one law it was provided as
follows: "The electors shall determine by
ballot at the annual election to be held in
November next, whether this act shall or shall
not become a law," and if a majority voted
against it, then it was to be void, but if a
majority favored it, then it was to take effect
from a day named. As the law in question
was not obnoxious to this objection, it was
sustained. "The popular will is expressed
under and by virtue of a law that is in force
and effect, and the people neither make nor
repeal it. They only determine whether a
certain thing shall be done under the law, and
not whether said law shall take effect. The
law had full and absolute vitality 'when it
passed from the hands of the legislature.'
3
3
In 1872 .the constitutionality of a local
option law was sustained in New Jersey, in
State v. Court of Common Pleas.'6  This
law provided that it should be lawful for per-
sons duly qualified to determine by ballot
whether license should be granted. That if a
majority of the votes cast were for no license,
it should not thereafter be lawful to grant
any such license until otherwise decided by a
contrary vote at some subsequent town meet-
ing; that from and after the passage of the
act, it should not be lawful for any person
within said township, without a license, to sell
13 72 Pa. St. 491.
14 14 Iowa, 228.
15 36 N. J. Law, 72.
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intoxicating liquors, etc. The court con-
ceded that the law could not be sustained if
it involved a delegation of the law-making
power, and said: "The will of the legislature
must be expressed in the form of a law by
their own acts. If it is left to the contin-
gency of a popular vote to pronounce
:whether it shall take effect, it is not the will
of the law-makers, but -the voice of their
constituents which molds the rule of action.
* * * * The test will be whether this
enactment, when it passed from the hands of
the law-giver, had taken the form of a com-
plete law. It denounces as a misdemeanor
the selling of liquor without license; so far it
is positive and free from any contingency.
It left to the popular vote to determine, not
whether it should be lawful to sell without
license, but whether the contingency should
arise under which license might be granted.
* * * * The legislature has pronounced
what the law shall be, and it can not be, and
is not, abrogated, changed or altered by the
popular expression."
In 1875 the Supreme Court of Maryland
also sustained the constitutionality of a local
option law, in Fell v. State. 16 The act pro-
vided: 1. For an election to be held on a certain
day, at which the voters of the several Qlec-
tion districts, in the counties named in the act,
should cast their ballots "for the sale of
spirituous or fermented liquors," or "against
the sale" of such liquors. 2. That if it should
be found that a majority of the votes in any
district had been cast against the sale of
such liquors, then it should not be lawful for
any person to sell such liquors in said district.
3. A penalty was prescribed for the violation'of
the act. 4. It was provided that the act should
take effect immediately after it'should have
been determined by a majority of the people in
any such district that such sale should not be
made. "Now, what has been delegated to the
voters," asked the court, "by this act of
assembly? Certainly not the power to make
the law, or to repeal existing laws. They are
called on by the first section simply to ex-
press, by their ballots, their opinion or senti-
ments as to the subject-matter to which the
law relates. They declare no consequences,
prescribe no penalties, and exercise no legis-
lative functions. The consequences are de-
clared in the law, and are exclusively the re-
sult of the legislative will. The act of the
assembly is a perfect and complete law, as it
left the halls of legislation and was approved
by the governor; but by its terms it was
made to go into operation in any district,
upon the contingency of a majority of the
legal voters within the district being ascer-
tained to be in favor of the prohibition con-
tained in the second section." The law was
thereupon upheld. In this same year the Su-
preme Court of Connecticut sustained one of
these laws, in State v. Wilcox. 17 This law
prohibited the sale of liquors without a
license, and authorized the county commis-
sioners to grant licenses upon the recommend-
ations of the selectmen of the town. But
the law also provided that any town might, at
its annual meeting, by ballot prohibit the
selectmen from making such recommend-
ations. The court thought that such a law
did not involve a delegation of legislative
power to the people, to the county commis-
sioners, or to the selectmen, but that it was a
perfect and complete enactment as it came
from the hands of the law-making power.
"Licenses may be granted by the county
commissioners to suitable persons, if recom-
mended by a majority of the selectmen, and
the towns may instruct their selectmen not to
recommend any persons. But these are not
legislative powers. They are police regula-
tions, quite fit and proper to be exercised by
municipalities, county commissioners, or
boards of selectmen, for the protection of the
morals and health, and the promotion of the
prosperity of their localities."
And this brings us to the consideration of
another reason which has of late been as-
signed to sustain the constitutionality of these
local option laws. It is conceded that the
legislature can empower municipal corpora-
tions to regulate or prohibit the traffic in in-
toxicating liquors,as it shall deem for the best
interests of their respective municipalities.
If the common council of a city, or the super-
visors of a county, can be invested with this
discretionary power of establishing suitable
police regulations, why not empower the peo-
ple themselves to determine the question of
license or no license? A trust can not be
delegated to one body rather than another;
17 42 Conn. 364.16 42 MId. 71.
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and if it is not an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power, an abrogation of the
trust reposed in the law-making power, to
enact that a common council of a city may
make proper police regulations in reference
to this subject, how can it be unconstitutional
to invest the people themselves with this
power ?If the one does not involve an abroga-
tion of the trust, it is submitted that the other
does not. This is the view taken of this ques-
tion by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in Commonwealth v. Bennett,18 de-
cided in 1871. In this case the' law author-
ized the inhabitants of any city or town at
any annual election, to vote for or.against the
sale of spirituous or intoxicating liquors, and
provided that, in case the vote was against
such sale, then the sale should be pro-
hibited in such city or town. Counsel urged
upon the court the unconstitutionality of the
act, upon the theory that it involved a dele-
gation of power. The answer of the court
was: "We can see no ground for such a
position." "It is equally within the power
of the legislature to authorize a town by vote
of the inhabitants, or a city by vote of the
city council, to determine whether the sale of
particular kinds of liquors within its limits
shall be permitted or prohibited." The court
thought that although this subject was not
embraced within the ordinary power to make
by-laws and ordinances, it nevertheless fell
within that class of police *regulations which
might properly be entrusted to municipal au-
thority by express legislative enactment.
This case has been subsequently followed by
the same court in Commonwealth v. Dean. 19
The same doctrine has been recently an-
nounced by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
in State v. Cooke. 20 The legislature of that
State had passed an act providing that the
legal voters of Rochester should have the
right to vote upon and determine for them-
selves the question, whether license for the
sale of intoxicating liquors within that mu-
nicipality should be granted or not. The
powur to make such a prohibition had for-
merly been vested in the common council.
The court, in sustaining the constitutionality
of the act, said: "When the legislature con-
fers any power upon a municipal corporation,
18 108 Mass. 27.
19 110 Mass. 357.
20 24 Minn. 247.
it may prescribe by whom the power shall be
exercised, by a particular officer or set of
officers, or by the electors at large; and the
removal of the power in question from the
council to the legal voters was unquestion-
ably valid."
The conclusion is irresistible, that a local
option law is by no means an unconstitutional
measure; that the late decisions must be re-
garded as having definitely decided the ques-
tion, that such laws are to be upheld by the
courts. To our mind the reasoning of the
Massachusetts and Minnesota cases is highly
satisfactory, and seems conclusive of the
whole matter. The same theory, too, is ad-
vanced in the case cited from New Jersey,
and we have no doubt, will commend itself
to the judgment of courts, as the question
may arise hereafter.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
THE NATURE AND EFFECT OF A QUIT-
CLAIM DEED.
The character and effect given to a deed of re-
lease and quit-claim in this country, are peculiarly
American. In England, a deed of release, under
general principles of law, can never operate as a
conveyance in a technical sense, unless the party
taking such deed is in possession of the land, and
then the deed merely operates to enlarge the es-
tate, whatever it may be. It could never operate
as an enlargement of the estate, unless the re-
leasee had an estate of some kind to be enlarged,-
such as possession or some other iuteest or estate
in the land which qualified him for receiving or
availing himself of the rights or benefits relin-
quished. Burton Real Prop. 15; Shep. Touch.
320; Kerr v. Freeman, 33 Miss. 292; Rowe v.
Beckett, 30 Ind. 162; Branham v. Mayor, 24 Cal.
606; Bennett v. Irwin, 3 Johns. 363. There, in
order to give effect to the deed of release as a
conveyance, it is first necessary to execute a lease,
(or bargain and sale for a limited period), which,
by force of the statute of uses, puts the lessee or
bargainee in possession; and being thus in posses-
sion, although by a mere fiction, the release oper-
ating by way of enlargement of the estate, is
effectual to transfer the entire title. In Hall v.
Ashby, (9 Ohio, 96), the court say: "So artificial
a machinery, for the purpose of effecting an ob-
ject so very simple, has never been considered
necessary in this State." It is true that in En-
gland, as well as in this country, courts have gone
very far in modifying the rules of conveyance,
both those of the common law and those which have
their effect from the statute of uses, so as to give,
effect and operation to the deeds of parties, rather
according to the manifest intent, than according,
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